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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM: Joe L. Zaring
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SUBJECT: Monthly Warning Assessment: Western Europe

TURKEY

1. In the near term, the military takeover in Turkey will restore some degree of stability and order. The generals' first aim will be to control the violence that provoked their intervention, possibly taking harsh reprisals against terrorists. The military leaders intend to restore civilian rule as early as possible, however, and will probably soon appoint a constituent assembly to prepare constitutional revisions and new laws governing elections and political parties. In foreign policy, they will mainly follow former prime minister Demirel's line: fundamental orientation toward the West, support for the intercommunal talks on Cyprus (but firmness in defense of Turkish Cypriot interests), perhaps greater flexibility toward Greek reintegration into NATO and on Aegean issues.

2. The generals also plan to carry forward the economic program Demirel initiated. They are in a stronger position to implement the disciplined plan, but their continued access to Western economic aid could be jeopardized if the Europeans -- particularly the West Germans -- come to believe the regime has violated civil rights too harshly or has moved too slowly toward reinstituting civilian rule.

3. In the long term, there is reason for concern that the military leaders may fail to gain control of either the terrorists or the economy, and that Turkey's transition back to democracy -- likely to take at least a year or two in any case -- will falter. The isolation or repression of many of Turkey's civilian political leaders, the possibility of organized resistance at home or abroad, and Turkey's historical political polarization

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will all work against the generals' efforts to reconstruct Turkey's political system into a functioning democracy.

WESTERN EUROPE - POLAND

4. So far, West European reactions to events in Poland have closely paralleled those of the US: sympathy for the strikers and the autonomous unions they are trying to organize, but caution against any actions that could encourage Soviet intervention. Many West Europeans fear that, for both economic and political reasons, the Polish government will be unable to carry out the reforms it has promised, and that a more severe crisis could erupt in coming months, heightening the risk of direct Soviet intervention. Nevertheless, popular support in Western Europe for Polish workers could grow stronger than what the US would consider prudent. And the fresh reminder that Eastern Europe is still vulnerable to turmoil and to Soviet pressure will likely strengthen most West Europeans' conviction that they must work still harder to ensure East-West stability on the Continent rather than jeopardize it by instituting sanctions against the Soviets for their actions in Afghanistan -- whatever the situation in Southwest Asia and the Gulf.

WESTERN EUROPE - IRAN/IRAQ

5. The conflict in the Persian Gulf will strengthen the West Europeans' already profound sense of vulnerability to events beyond their control. Their resulting proclivity for caution will be reinforced (as it was by events in Poland), and so will their fundamental ambivalence toward the US role in the Middle East. While they know the US is the ultimate guarantor of their interests in the region (and while they may well support US actions to protect the flow of oil out of the Gulf), they fear at the same time that direct US involvement could trigger Soviet intervention in some form -- turning a crisis into a disaster. The war between Iran and Iraq also underscores the Europeans' view that their interests are more closely associated with the Arabs than US interests are, and it thus aggravates the differences between the US and Europe over Israel as well as the differences over how to protect the West's long-term interests in Iran.

SPAIN

6. Prime Minister Suarez' cabinet changes and his new economic policies do not presage any shift in Spain's foreign policy, which still aims first of all at EC membership and, in the more distant future, at some form of attachment to NATO. But Suarez' replacement of Foreign Minister Oreja and his silence on the NATO issue since June confirm that he never fully shared Oreja's enthusiasm for early NATO entry. Also, the government's economic austerity program will mean cutbacks in defense spending, and

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possibly more Spanish pressure for economic concessions from the US in the base negotiations now beginning.

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PORTUGAL

8. Although it may have lost some ground recently, a narrow victory of the governing Democratic Alliance coalition still seems likely in Portugal's legislative elections on 5 October. Socialist leader Soares has speculated that such an outcome -- followed by President Eanes' victory in presidential elections later this year -- would lead to deadlock, still another election in 1981, and probably the demise of Eanes himself as well as that of the Socialist Party as a viable political force. On the other hand, should the AD lose in October, Soares expects a split in the Social Democratic Party (now a participant in the governing coalition) and a new alignment of centrist forces including the Socialists that could form a stable majority government. Prospects therefore are that Portugal's major political uncertainties -- over constitutional reform, party realignments, and political leadership -- will continue for some time.


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